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Family Ties: The Intersection between  
Data Protection and Competition in EU Law 
 
Francisco Costa-Cabral and Orla Lynskey* 
 
 
Abstract: 
Personal data has become the object of trade in the digital economy, and companies 
compete to acquire and process this data. This rivalry is subject to the application of 
competition law. However, personal data also has a dignitary dimension which is 
protected through data protection law and the EU Charter rights to data protection and 
privacy. This paper maps the relationship between these legal frameworks. It 
identifies the commonalities that facilitate their intersection, whilst acknowledging 
their distinct methods and aims. It argues that when the material scope of these legal 
frameworks overlap, competition law can incorporate data protection law as a 
normative yardstick when assessing non-price competition. Data protection can thus 
act as an internal constraint on competition law. In addition, it advocates that 
following the legal and institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, data 
protection and other fundamental rights also exercise an external constraint on 
competition law and, in certain circumstances, can prevent or shape its application. As 
national and supranational regulators grapple with the challenge of developing a 
dynamic information economy that respects fundamental rights, recognition of these 
constraints would pave the way for a more coherent EU law approach to a digital 
society. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
‘I do not see the competition portfolio as a lonely portfolio. On the contrary, 
competition is central to the things we want to create both in and for Europe.’1 
 
The digitisation of data, including personal data, has led to an exponential increase in 
the scale of personal data processing and the ease with which this processing can 
occur. 2  Almost every online transaction requires the disclosure of personal data, 
which can then be aggregated, analysed, and traded for further use. Personal data is so                                                              
* Emile Noël Fellow, NYU School of Law; Assistant Professor, LSE Law Department. This article 
further develops and refines ideas that were set out in ‘The Internal and External Constraints of Data 
Protection on Competition Law in the EU’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper Series, 
WPS 25-2015.  
1  Hearing of European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager before the European 
Parliament on 2 October 2014 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/hearings-2014/en/schedule/02-10-
2014/margrethe-vestager> (unless otherwise stated, all URLs were last accessed 26 October 2016). 
2 Murray, Information Technology Law (OUP, 2016), pp. 5-11 and 51-54.  
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valuable that many companies are willing to forego monetary payment for their 
digital services in order to gain access to it.3 Therefore, while personal data is not a 
currency, it has monetary value. Yet, beyond this economic value, personal data is 
also intrinsically linked to the dignity, autonomy, and personality of individuals. This 
dual nature of personal data is acknowledged, and given expression, in European 
Union (EU) law. EU data protection policy seeks to ensure the free flow of personal 
data while respecting fundamental rights, in particular the rights to privacy and data 
protection. 4 This legislative framework is supported by the provisions of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter), Article 8 of which provides for a ‘right 
to data protection’.  
Critics argue that the EU’s data protection framework is unable to tackle the 
challenges posed by current personal data processing practices. 5  This framework 
seeks to grant individuals control over their personal data through mechanisms such 
as consent, rights to information and rights to access, rectify and delete data.6 Such 
individual control is, however, frustrated by information and power asymmetries. 
While individuals become increasingly ‘transparent’ or ‘legible’ to those processing 
personal data, data processing practices are opaque and online goods and services are 
frequently offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis leaving little real scope for choice.7  
Left to its own devices, the market strays away from an optimal level of individual 
control over personal data.  
Against this backdrop, there have been calls for a broader structural approach to 
personal data protection by fostering closer integration between data protection and 
other EU law policies that shape markets, including competition law. The European 
Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has advocated that competition law enforcement 
should consider the data protection rights of consumers and intervene to control 
market power in the digital economy.8 Simultaneously, the European Commission 
(Commission) and national competition authorities (NCAs) are also considering 
whether competition law enforcement should incorporate data protection and privacy 
concerns, an issue that has arisen in the context of their focus on ‘big data’.9                                                              
3 Recognising this reality, Article 3(1) of the proposed directive on digital contracts applies when ‘a 
price is to be paid or the consumer actively provides counter-performance other than money in the form 
of personal data or any other data’. COM (2015) 634 Final, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts on the supply of the digital 
content. See also Hoofnagle and Whittington, “Free Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most 
Popular Price”, (2014) 61 UCLA Law Review, 606.  
4 O.J. 1995, L 281/23. Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, Art 1(1). 
5 Koops, “The Trouble with European Data Protection Law”, (2014) 4 International Data Privacy Law, 
250.  
6 Lazaro and Le Métayer, “The Control over Personal Data: True Remedy or Fairy Tale?”, (2015) 
12(1) scripted, 3.  
7 Cate and Mayer-Schönberger, “Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data”, (2013) 3 International 
Data Privacy Law, 67. 
8 These were the conclusions of the Preliminary Opinion by the EDPS, followed by an Opinion aimed 
at ‘[m]oving from analysis to action’. EDPS Preliminary Opinion “Privacy and competitiveness in the 
age of big data: The interplay between data protection, competition law and consumer protection in the 
Digital Economy”, March 2014 29-32; EDPS Opinion 8/2016 “On the coherent enforcement of 
fundamental rights in the age of big data”, 23 September 2016. 
9  Commissioner Vestager, “Competition in a Big Data World”, 17 January 2016, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-big-data-
world_en>; Joint Report – Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, “Competition Law and 
Data”, 10 May 2016, 
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To many, this debate will look familiar. It has long been argued that certain public 
policies objectives, or non-economic concerns, are of such importance that they must 
be considered when applying competition law.10 In particular, it has been argued that 
the Commission should expand its interpretation of the notion of ‘consumer welfare’ 
– the standard it uses to guide its application of the competition rules11 – in order to 
incorporate these public policy objectives. This has nevertheless always been resisted 
on the grounds that the consumer welfare standard is guided by economic principles 
and that competition authorities lack the legal competence and technical expertise to 
incorporate non-economic concerns within their remit. Competition experts 12 and, 
ostensibly, the Commission 13 have thus invoked these arguments again in protest 
against an interpretation of the consumer welfare standard that would incorporate data 
protection. 
This paper departs from this well-versed discussion14 and examines the relationship 
between data protection and competition law from another perspective. It emphasises 
that data protection and competition law are members of the EU law family. 
Therefore, while their material scope and normative objectives differ in many ways, 
the two areas also have significant ‘family ties’. Both policies aim to achieve market 
integration and share a concern for the welfare of the individual. Furthermore, data 
protection has a privileged status in the EU family, and may therefore be 
distinguished from other public policy objectives, as a result of its inclusion in the EU 
Charter. This paper asserts that these family ties have two consequences for the 
relationship between data protection and competition law. 
First, data protection law can act as an internal influence on substantive competition 
law assessments.  Competition law deals with ‘competitive parameters’, that is to say, 
the factors to which consumers respond on markets such as price, quality, choice and 
innovation. Given that companies compete for the acquisition of personal data but 
rarely specify a price for it, the data protection conditions offered to individuals can 
reflect the parameters of quality, choice and innovation. While there is an increasing 
body of economic analysis that sheds light on the how personal data processing 
                                                                                                                                                                              
<http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf>; McLennan: 
Global Competition Review, ‘Netherlands starts big data probe’, 23 September 2016, 
<http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/41893/netherlands-starts-big-data-probe/> . 
10 Townley, Article 81 EC and Public Policy (Hart, 2009). 
11 For instance, O.J. 2009, C 45/7. Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, point 5. 
12 Ohlhausen and Okuliar, “Competition, Consumer Protection, and the Right (Approach) to Privacy”, 
(2015) Antitrust Law Journal, 37-38; Tucker, “The Proper Role of Privacy in Merger Review”, (2015) 
2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2-4. 
13 Commissioner Vestager stated that ‘I don't think we need to look to competition enforcement to fix 
privacy problems’, cit. supra note 9.   
14 The EDPS appears to have also done so: the Preliminary Opinion calls for ‘a new concept of 
consumer harm for competition enforcement in digital economy’ which would incorporate the 
‘violation of rights to data protection’, but the Opinion does not pursue this line and reverts to the 
established view that consumer welfare ‘has never been clearly defined, and it has tended to be used to 
address market structure and economic efficiency and only indirectly addresses individual consumer 
concerns; such as privacy’. Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 26 and 32; Opinion of 
the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 8. See further, Costa-Cabral, “The Preliminary Opinion of the European 
Data Protection Supervisor and the Discretion of the Commission in Enforcing Competition law”, 
(2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 498-506. 
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benefits and harms consumers, 15 such economic analysis alone may be unable to 
determine when competition intervention is desirable in the face of multiple trade-
offs. Data protection law – a framework designed to identify and achieve an optimal 
level of personal data protection – can provide the normative guidance that 
competition law lacks in relation to non-price competitive parameters. For example, 
infringements of data protection law, or detrimental changes to important data 
protection conditions, can indicate consumer exploitation or prohibited methods of 
competition. Such use of data protection law as a normative benchmark would not 
expand the notion of consumer welfare to include public policy and non-economic 
concerns. Rather, data protection would fit within the internal logic of competition 
law and would, like other areas of law such as intellectual property, simply provide an 
insight into the normative backdrop for competitive activity.  
Secondly, data protection law can impose external limits on the enforcement of 
competition law, as a result of its status as a fundamental right. The right to data 
protection could, for instance, preclude the Commission from accepting commitments 
or remedies from undertakings that would interfere with that right. In such 
circumstances, data protection acts as an external constraint on competition law: it 
does not fit within the logic of competition, or align with its objectives. To date, the 
impact of the right to data protection on competition law has only been explored in 
relation to the rights of individuals who are subject to competition investigations.16 
The Court of Justice of the EU (the Court) has nevertheless confirmed that the EU 
Charter constrains the actions of EU Institutions when they adopt legally binding 
measures. 17 This paper argues that such limitations also apply to the Commission 
when enforcing competition law. Again, this external constraint does not expand the 
material scope of competition law to incorporate public policy objectives: in this 
situation, data protection would not trigger the application of competition law but 
merely preclude or alter its application.  
These three issues – the normative coherence of EU law and the internal and external 
influence of data protection on competition law – shall be addressed in the three main 
sections below. This paper seeks, firstly, to contribute to the debate on the market 
failure at the heart of the digital economy. Markets involving personal data are 
thriving yet individuals have little control over their participation in these markets and 
do not benefit from competition on them. Secondly, this paper explores how the EU 
will integrate its Charter obligation to respect and promote fundamental rights with its 
existing duties to enforce economic policies.   
 
2. Family Traits: the Common Characteristics of Data Protection and 
Competition Law  
 
Data protection and competition law both influence the exercise of economic activity 
and seek to enhance the interests of individuals. They do this, however, at different 
ends of the same spectrum: data protection law protects the integrity of individual                                                              
15 O'Brien and Smith, “Privacy in Online Markets: A Welfare Analysis of Demand Rotations”, (2014) 
FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 323; Gal and Rubinfeld, “The Hidden Costs of Free 
Goods: Implications for Antitrust Enforcement”, NYU Law & Economics Research Paper No 14-44. 
16 Geradin and Kuschewsky, “Data Protection in the Context of Competition Law Investigations: An 
Overview of the Challenges”, (2014) 37(1) World Competition, 69. 
17 Joined Cases C-92 & 93/09, Schecke and Eifert, EU:C:2010:662.   
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decision-making regarding personal data processing (for instance, by granting when 
consent is used as a legal basis for data processing) while competition law safeguards 
consumers against unlawful exercises of market power. However, these two fields of 
law intersect when undertakings compete on the basis of data protection, that is to 
say, when consumers are influenced by the personal data protection conditions 
governing the processing of their personal data. Their shared objectives then pave the 
way for data protection law to influence substantive competition law assessments.  
2.1. The Hybrid Nature of the EU Data Protection Framework  
EU data protection law is comprised of a mixture of primary and secondary law. 
Article 16 TFEU provides an explicit legal basis for EU data protection legislation 
while Article 8 of the EU Charter sets out a right to data protection. At present, the 
1995 Data Protection Directive regulates personal data processing, however a General 
Data Protection Regulation (the GDPR)18 will replace this Directive in May 2018. 
The GDPR seeks to clarify existing rights and obligations while introducing changes 
to improve compliance and enforcement. This secondary law must be interpreted in 
light of the EU Charter rights to privacy and data protection.19  
The EU data protection framework has a broad scope of application, as it applies to 
personal data processing conducted by natural and legal persons and public and 
private bodies, with limited exceptions.20 Personal data is defined as any information 
relating to an ‘identified or identifiable individual’21 and processing as ‘any operation 
or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by 
automatic means’.22 Personal data processing is permissible provided it has a legal 
basis and also complies with certain safeguards.23 The most well-known legal basis 
for processing is the consent of the individual ‘data subject’, however there is no 
hierarchy amongst the six legal bases listed. Processing is therefore equally legitimate 
if, for instance, it is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation or for the 
performance of a contract. 24 Of the safeguards, the so-called ‘purpose limitation’ 
principle should be highlighted. According to the principle, personal data must be 
‘adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed’.25  
The framework also provides individual data subjects with rights over their personal 
data, for instance, the right to information regarding the processing of their personal 
data,26 the right to delete personal data in certain circumstances27 and the right to 
access personal data. 28  Through this framework, data protection determines the 
boundary between permissible and impermissible personal data processing and, in so 
doing, reconciles individual rights with other societal interests.  
                                                             
18 O.J. 2016, L 119/1. Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46.  
19 Case C-73/07, Satamedia, EU:C:2008:727; Case 362/14, Schrems, EU:C:2015:650. 
20 For instance, Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 3; GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 2.  
21 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 2(a); GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 4(1).  
22 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 2(b); GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 4(2).  
23 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Arts. 6 and 7; GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Arts. 5 and 6. 
24 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 7; GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 6. 
25 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 6(1)(c); GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 5(1)(b). 
26 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Arts. 10 and 11; GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Arts. 13 and 14.  
27 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 12(b); GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 17.  
28 Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 12(a); GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 15.  
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Underpinning this legal framework are hybrid normative objectives: an economic 
objective, and a rights-based objective. From the outset, the EU data protection 
regime has sought to achieve the free flow of personal data between Member States.29 
Indeed, the legal basis for the 1995 Data Protection Directive was the ‘catch-all’ 
internal market provision for harmonisation, Article 100a EEC (now Article 114 
TFEU). 30  However, this free flow of personal data could only be achieved by 
ensuring that Member States offered an adequate, and harmonised, level of 
fundamental rights protection to individual data subjects. Data protection’s economic 
and fundamental rights objectives are therefore mutually reinforcing. 
2.2. The normative concerns of data protection and competition law 
Recognising divergence in scope and method  
The competition law provisions apply to ‘undertakings’, that is any entities engaged 
in economic activity. 31  Undertakings are prohibited from colluding to restrict 
competition under Article 101 TFEU, from abusing a dominant position under Article 
102 TFEU, and from engaging in a concentration that significantly impacts upon 
effective competition pursuant to the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR).32 Competition 
law, therefore applies to all economic activity. The scope of data protection law can 
thus be distinguished as it, firstly, only applies to the activity of personal data 
processing (and not other economic activity), and, secondly, it applies irrespective of 
whether the personal data processing is an economic or non-economic activity.33   
The nature of the harm that data protection and competition law seek to address can 
also be distinguished. Competition law seeks to avoid economic harm, namely a 
negative impact on the parameters of price, quality, choice and innovation which 
affect efficiency or consumer welfare. While data protection law can also prevent 
such economic harm (for instance, by tackling information and power asymmetries), 
this is not the sole objective of the data protection rules. These rules also seek to 
prevent harm to fundamental rights, such as privacy, non-discrimination and freedom 
of association. There are therefore many circumstances in which data protection and 
competition law will have no mutual influence. For instance, even if an undertaking’s 
data processing policy complies with competition law, it may entail a violation of the 
right to privacy. Equally, not all competition law concerns are data protection 
concerns: for instance, personal data processing plays no role in many markets.  
It is also important to acknowledge that the methods employed in each field are 
distinct and, in this regard, data protection law appears more akin to consumer 
protection law. Ohlhausen and Okuliar distinguish between competition law and 
consumer protection law by suggesting that ‘antitrust laws are focused on broader 
macroeconomic harms, mainly the maintenance of efficient price discovery in 
markets, whereas the consumer protection laws are preoccupied with ensuring the                                                              
29 The free flow of personal data was ancillary to trade in other goods and services and personal data 
was not viewed as an object of trade in its own right. COM (90) 314 final, Communication on the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data in the Community and 
Information Security, 2. 
30 Lynskey, The Foundations of EU Data Protection Law (Oxford, 2015), pp. 46-89.  
31 Joined Cases C-180 to 184/98, Pavlov, EU:C:2000:428, para. 74. Certain provisions of the GDPR 
also apply to ‘undertakings’, such as ‘binding corporate rules’ (Art. 47) and ‘general conditions for 
imposing administrative fines’ (Art. 83). 
32 O.J. 2004, L 24/1. Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 
33 Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596, para 31 and paras 37-48.  
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integrity of each specific contractual bargain’.34 Similarly, Averitt and Lande argue 
that antitrust caters for the availability of consumer choice while consumer protection 
law provides consumers with the relevant information for the effective exercise of this 
choice.35 From this perspective, data protection and competition law (like consumer 
protection and competition law36) intervene to influence market conduct at different 
points on the same spectrum. Competition law applies to correct market failures that 
are external to the individual, such as undertakings colluding, while data protection 
law applies to correct internal failings, such as information and power asymmetries 
that prevent individuals from controlling their personal data. 
These divergences may explain why data protection and competition law have been 
applied concurrently to date. For instance, in Asnef-Equifax37 the Court considered 
whether banks restricted competition by exchanging information about the solvency 
of potential borrowers. The Court declared that ‘any possible issues relating to the 
sensitivity of personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law’.38 The 
Commission took a similar stance in its merger decisions in Google/Doubleclick39 and 
Facebook/WhatsApp, 40  refusing to take into consideration the potential data 
protection implications brought about by the merging of the parties respective 
datasets. For example, the Commission stated in Google/Doubleclick that its decision 
referred ‘exclusively to the appraisal of this operation with Community rules on 
competition’. 41 Thus, both the Commission and the Court appear to exclude data 
protection considerations from the application of competition law. 
This paper suggests that these findings do not – and should not – preclude data 
protection from influencing competition law. This is for two reasons. First, in these 
cases, the EU Charter was not invoked and there was no discussion of the external 
influence of data protection law on competition law. This issue will be developed in 
Section 4. Secondly, such statements fail to recognise that the level of data protection 
offered to individuals is also subject to competition. Thus, even the aspects of data 
protection law that ostensibly relate to non-economic concerns – such as the 
conditions governing the processing of sensitive personal data – may be parameters of 
competition. Data protection law can help competition law judge the extent of such 
competition.  
Competition on data protection conditions   
Undertakings compete to provide the ‘best’ goods and services to consumers. It is 
standard economic practice to differentiate between the offerings of undertakings on 
                                                             
34 Ohlhausen and Okuliar, op. cit. supra note 12, 121.  
35 Averitt and Lande, “Using the ‘consumer choice’ approach to antitrust law”, (2007) 74 Antitrust Law 
Journal, 176. 
36  Albors-Llorens, “Competition and Consumer Law in the European Union: Evolution and 
Convergence”, (2014) Yearbook of European Law, 1.  The processing of personal data may also raise 
issues of unfair competition, the harmonisation of which by EU law has been limited to consumer 
protection, namely protecting consumers against misleading marketing practices. Stucke, “The Court of 
Justice and the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”, (2015) CMLRev 724. 
37 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, EU:C:2006:734.  
38 Ibid., para. 63.  
39 Case COMP/M.4731, Google/DoubleClick. 
40 Case COMP/M.7217, Facebook/ WhatsApp. 
41 Google/DoubleClick, cit. supra note 39, point. 368. 
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the basis of a number of competitive parameters: price, choice, quality and 
innovation.42 In Post Danmark I43 the Court stated that: 
‘Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the 
market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, 
choice, quality or innovation’.44 
There is now a growing consensus that consumer decision-making may be influenced 
by the level of ‘privacy’ offered to individuals when acquiring goods or services. 
Authors have thus argued that undertakings can engage in ‘competition on privacy’,45 
with such competition viewed as an element of competition on quality.46  
While it is important to recognise ‘competition on privacy’ in the digital environment, 
we suggest that the concept of ‘competition on data protection’ is preferred in the EU 
context. Data protection and privacy are heavily overlapping yet distinct concepts. 
While data protection law incorporates informational privacy, it does not incorporate 
aspects of privacy such as intrusions on physical seclusion, for instance. Moreover, 
aspects of data protection law – such as its unconditional application to personal data 
in the public domain, or the rights it grants, such as rights of access to data, data 
security standards and the (new) right to data portability47 – are not captured by 
‘privacy’. References to ‘competition on data protection’ should therefore be 
understood as representing the multitude of factors regulated by data protection law 
that may influence consumer decision-making including, but not limited to, privacy 
concerns.   
This overlap in material scope – competition on data protection – is the starting point 
for our proposal that data protection law can act as a normative benchmark for 
competition law. Moreover, in addition to this material overlap, both policies also 
share common objectives. These common objectives lend further support to the case 
for their coherent application when both policies are engaged by a competitive 
practice.  
Common objectives 
Data protection should act as a normative benchmark for competition law, and the 
two policies should be applied in a holistic manner, when their material scope 
intersects. The fact that both policies share common objectives lends support to such a 
holistic approach: both promote market integration, seek to protect individuals, and 
tackle power asymmetries.                                                               
42 O.J. 2004, C 31/5. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation 
on the control of concentrations between undertakings, point 8; O.J. 2004, C 101/97. Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, point 21; Enforcement Guidance on Article 102 TFEU, cit. 
supra note 11, point 5. 
43 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark I, EU:C:2012:172. 
44  Ibid., para. 22. See also the references to these competitive parameters in Case C-67/13, CB, 
EU:C:2014:2204, para. 51; Case C-382/12, MasterCard, EU:C:2014:2201, para. 93; and Case C-
413/06 P, Bertelsmann, EU:C:2008:392, para. 121. 
45 Ohlhausen and Okuliar, op. cit. supra note 12, 36; Kimmel and Kestenbaum, “What’s Up with 
WhatsApp? A Transatlantic View on Privacy and Merger Enforcement in Digital Markets”, (2014) 
Antitrust, Fall, 51; Tucker, op. cit. supra note 12, 4. 
46 Kimmel and Kestenbaum, op. cit. supra note 45, 53; Grunes and Stucke, “No Mistake about it: The 
Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data”, (2015) University of Tennessee Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 269, 4. 
47 GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 20. 
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Both data protection and competition law seek to advance market integration. As 
mentioned above, the Data Protection Directive was enacted as an instrument of 
market integration. The GDPR shall further this market integration objective by 
replacing the Directive with a Regulation to ensure more substantive harmonisation 
and introducing a new EU agency to ensure uniform data protection enforcement and 
thus procedural harmonisation. 48 Competition law promotes market integration by 
preventing private parties from erecting barriers to trade between Members States 
through mechanisms such as territorial allocation, national discrimination, and 
restrictions on exports or on parallel trade. 49  Data protection law is therefore an 
instrument of positive integration while competition law works largely through 
negative integration.  
Similarly, both share a concern for the welfare of the individual. Competition law is 
concerned about individuals as aggregate consumers. The basic assumption of 
competition law is that competition between undertakings increases consumer 
welfare: consumers prefer better goods and services, and undertakings succeed in the 
market by offering them.50 Data subjects – the direct beneficiaries of data protection 
law – are natural persons and thus include consumers. If consumers are sensitive to 
data protection conditions,51 meaningful competition can enhance data protection and 
foster it as a competitive advantage.52 While data protection will provide baseline 
protection for individuals, competition can enhance the options available to 
consumers.53 Although ‘informational self-determination’ is not the sole concern, or 
an absolute objective, of data protection law, the data protection regime displays a 
normative preference for individual control over personal data.54 This is very relevant 
for competition law since it is this control that allows consumers to express their 
preferences accurately. Therefore, data protection and competition law are in 
normative agreement: good data protection conditions facilitate individual control 
over personal data and more meaningful competition between undertakings on the 
basis of such conditions.  
Finally, both fields of law are concerned with power asymmetries. The individual is 
often in a weak position relative to undertakings. Data protection therefore protects 
the individual throughout the data processing cycle, by ensuring that there is a legal 
basis for processing, data protection safeguards are respected and that the individual 
can exercise rights vis-à-vis the data controller at all times. Competition law also 
seeks to safeguard consumers against undertakings’ market power as it is market 
power which allows undertakings to deviate from consumer preferences.55 Therefore, 
when undertakings maintain or reinforce their position vis-a-vis individuals in one                                                              
48 GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 68(1).  
49 See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten, EU:C:1966:41.  
50 The Court has acknowledged that competition law safeguards both the interests of the consumer and 
competition ‘as such’, and that there is a link between the two. See Joined Cases 501, 513, 515 & 
519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline, EU:C:2009:610 and Post Danmark I, cit. supra note 43, para. 20. 
51 Authors comment upon a so-called ‘privacy paradox’: while many users express concerns about 
privacy, few actually act on them for reasons discussed infra. See Cofone, “The Value of Privacy: 
Keep the Money Where the Mouth Is”, RILE Working Paper Series No 2014/15.  
52 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 33.  
53 The EDPS comments that ‘[c]ompetition and the possibility to change the service one is using is the 
single most effective power of a consumer to influence the market of services available to them’. 
Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 12.  
54 See Lynskey, op. cit. supra note 30, pp. 177-229.  
55 Therefore, competitive parameters are usually mentioned in relation to definitions of market power, 
see the references supra note 44. 
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field of law, this may have consequences for the other: less control over personal data 
may result in (more) market power, and market power may allow undertakings to 
impose unfair data processing conditions on individuals.56 The protection offered to 
individuals by both fields of law is thus mutually reinforcing.  
Data protection and competition law are therefore distinct but intertwined fields of 
law that share several normative concerns. These shared normative concerns have 
prompted a call from the EDPS for the competent authorities in each field to work 
together, 57 notably through a proposed Digital Clearing House.58 The next section 
will analyse situations where competition authorities can take the lead in this process 
by allowing data protection law to act as a normative yardstick against which non-
price competitive parameters can be reliably measured.   
 
3. A Little (Normative) Help from Data Protection Law 
 
As undertakings can compete on data protection, it follows that they may also distort 
such competition through anti-competitive behaviour. This section suggests that data 
protection can have a normative influence in assessing such anti-competitive 
behaviour. This claim is developed in two stages. First, it illustrates that substantive 
assessments of competition on data protection must incorporate an assessment of how 
personal data is acquired. Secondly, it suggests that competition law lacks the 
normative tools to assess non-price parameters in competition on data protection. 
Data protection law provides guidance to competition law on how to make these 
competitive assessments, and is therefore internalised by competition law rules.  
3.1. Competition on data protection and market power 
Determining market power based on personal data 
Whether personal data can lead to market power in certain goods and services is 
currently the subject of much debate by competition law experts.59 Little attention has 
however been paid to the (reverse) question of how market power in goods and 
services may influence competition on data protection. Personal data is now a 
commodity that is as valuable – if not more valuable – than those goods and 
services. 60  Competition for the acquisition of personal data must therefore be 
distinguished from competition for other goods and services where it serves as an 
input. 61  In other words, the relevant question (for our purposes) is not whether 
personal data allows undertakings to gain market power in ancillary markets, but how                                                              
56 ‘Where there is a limited number of operators or when one operator is dominant, the concept of 
consent becomes more and more illusory’, Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 35. 
57 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 8. 
58 Ibid., 15. 
59 See, for instance, Evans, “Multisided Platforms, Dynamic Competition, and the Assessment of 
Market Power for Internet-Based Firms”, (2016) University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law 
& Economics Research Paper No. 753, 23; Gal and Rubinfeld, op. cit. supra note 15, 36; Manne and 
Sperry, “The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into an Antitrust Framework”, 
(2015) 2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 8; Sokol and Ma, ‘Understanding Online Markets and Antitrust 
Analysis’, July 2016, < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2813855>. 
60  The EDPS comments that ‘control of data could be the missing element which explains the 
remarkable inflation in the market value of successful companies in the digital section’. Opinion of the 
EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 6. 
61 Ibid. 
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power in ancillary markets influences the decision of individuals to agree to personal 
data processing.  
It is therefore necessary to begin by differentiating this inquiry from the current focus 
on whether personal data contributes to market power in other goods and services. A 
joint report of the French and German NCAs states that ‘the issue of data possibly 
contributing to market power is most likely to arise and is, in many respects, the most 
interesting one from a competition standpoint’. 62  This is because merger control 
requires an assessment of the market power resulting from a concentration and 
concentrations may involve undertakings with access to significant personal data sets. 
The issue of whether personal data sets can constitute a barrier to entry, or otherwise 
lead to market power, also arises in the context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This 
issue is particularly contentious in the data-driven digital economy, as dynamic 
competition may lead to the replacement of existing markets by new markets through 
waves of creative destruction. 63  This paper does not seek to contribute to this 
contentious debate. The definition of relevant markets for ancillary goods and 
services, and whether personal data constitutes a barrier to entry in such markets, are 
factual questions to be settled on a case-by-case basis. In this context, data protection 
law merely provides a descriptive legal backgroundfor this assessment. 
Two-sided markets 
The flourishing doctrine on two- (or multi-) sided markets is also of limited relevance 
when assessing the extent to which undertakings compete on data protection.64 Two-
sided markets are generally characterised by indirect feedback effects between the 
two sides: the more users on one side, the more users on the other. This theory has 
been used to understand markets where online services are offered for free, like 
search engines and social networks: it has been postulated that undertakings do not 
profit directly from the market on the user side, but from the market on the 
advertising side.65 Services that are free at the point of user access are subsidised to 
attract users as a result of the positive feedback between the number of users and the 
advertising sold. Dynamic competition in these ‘markets for attention’ can, according 
to Evans, easily upset market power by consumers taking their attention elsewhere.66  
This theory attributes an important albeit limited role to personal data. It is often 
stated that personal data is the currency that pays for ‘free’ services in two-sided 
markets.67 However, this data is mostly seen as a vehicle for targeted advertising, 
leading competition analysis to focus solely on the advertising market:68 the viability 
of the undertaking depends on such advertising, and the revenue from this advertising 
                                                             
62 Joint Report of the German and French NCAs, cit. supra note 9, 25. Indeed, most of the joint report 
is dedicated to this issue. See, with the same emphasis, Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra 
note 8, 33; Commissioner Vestager, cit. supra note 9. 
63 Joint Report of the German and French NCAs, cit. supra note 9, 29. 
64 See, in general, Evans, op. cit. supra note 59; Stucke and Ezrachi, “When Competition Fails to 
Optimise Quality: A Look at Search Engines”, (2015) Research Paper No 268; O'Brien and Smith, op. 
cit. supra note 15. 
65 Stucke and Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 64, 7-8. 
66 Evans, op. cit. supra note 59, 28. 
67 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 6. 
68 Ibid. Providers of free services may thus escape being considered in a dominant position, as the 
market for advertising may be larger than that of the free service. Gebicka and Heinemann, “Social 
Media & Competition Law”, (2014) 37(2) World Competition, 155-156. 
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would, in turn, subsidise the free services offered. 69  For instance, in the 
Google/Doubleclick merger, the Commission did not analyse the impact of the 
concentration on competition for free services thereby ignoring the role of data 
protection on the side of the free service.70 Even when competition on the market for 
free services is analysed, it is only considered in light of its consequences for the 
advertising side – and not for competition on data protection. For instance, in 
Facebook/Whatsapp the Commission acknowledged that ‘competition on privacy’ 
exists. It stated that ‘apps compete for customers by attempting to offer the best 
communication experience’, including ‘privacy and security, the importance of which 
varies from user to user but which are becoming increasingly valued, as shown by the 
introduction of consumer communications apps specifically addressing privacy and 
security issues’.71 Hence, the Commission observed that following the announcement 
of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp many users changed services due to privacy 
concerns.72  
Despite these empirical findings that competition on data protection did exist for these 
free services,73 the Commission did not consider the effects of the merger on such 
competition. While the parties were not actual competitors and their activities did not 
overlap on the relevant markets,74 the Commission did investigate the effects of the 
merger on advertising: namely, the possible introduction of online advertising to 
WhatsApp, and whether Facebook could improve its advertising based on WhatsApp 
data.75 The Commission was thus concerned with whether Facebook could improve 
its competitive position in the advertising market.76 The Commission even noted that 
the extension of online advertising to WhatsApp would be seriously limited by 
‘dissatisfaction among the increasing number of users who significantly value privacy 
and security’.77 Yet, despite this recognition of the importance of data protection for 
consumers, the Commission did not consider the effects of combined activities for the 
competition on data protection – namely, as discussed below, whether Facebook 
could alter WhatsApp’s data protection conditions to the detriment of the consumer 
and remove an innovative constraint on its own data protection conditions.  
Competition for the acquisition of personal data 
The role of personal data emphasised in the context of two-sided markets is therefore 
unduly limited. The value of personal data goes beyond its use as an input for 
advertising: it is the raw material from which multiple digital business models may be 
fashioned.78 We therefore suggest that it may be relevant and necessary to investigate                                                              
69 Stucke and Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 64, 15. Much of the reticence to engage with free services 
comes from the (disputed) idea that they are always positive for consumer welfare. Newman, “Antitrust 
in Zero-Priced Markets: Foundations”, (2014) University of Memphis Research Paper No. 151., 49. 
70 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 3, 27. 
71 Facebook/WhatsApp, cit. supra note 40, point 87. 
72 Ibid., footnotes 79 and 174. 
73 Certainly in the communication services offered by WhatsApp, but the change by users following 
Facebook’s acquisition shows that consumers were also aware of that factor in the social network 
services offered by Facebook. 
74 Only Facebook was active in the market for online advertising services and they were not considered 
close competitors in the free services provided. See Facebook/WhatsApp, cit. supra note 40, points 
107, 158, and 165. 
75 Ibid., footnote 167. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Commission determined that they were not 
competing was because of their different privacy policies. Ibid., footnote 102. 
76 Ibid., point 187. 
77 Ibid., point 174. 
78 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 6. 
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whether a market for personal data acquisition exists as a distinct market. Facebook 
paid WhatsApp USD 19 billion for its service, despite the Commission’s finding that 
the acquisition would not influence the advertising market. Somewhat belatedly, the 
Commission now recognises: 
‘The issue seems to be that it’s not always turnover that makes a company an 
attractive merger partner. Sometime, what matters are its assets. That could be a 
customer base or even a set of data’.79 
Personal data can be acquired by a merger, or even traded as a commodity in 
dedicated markets,80 but at some point it will have to have been obtained from data 
subjects. The acquisition of personal data is thus distinct from personal data’s 
potential role as a barrier to entry in ancillary markets or from its role on the 
revenue/advertising side in two-sided markets.  
Broadly speaking, competition for the acquisition of personal data may be driven in 
two distinct ways: there may be competition on the basis of the data protection 
offered, or competition on the basis of the goods and services associated with the data 
processing. In most instances, associated goods and services are viewed as the 
primary driver of competition with competition on data protection treated as a 
secondary aspect of that competition (like the privacy concerns in the market for 
communication services in Facebook/WhatsApp). Thus, authors treat poor privacy as 
degradation of the quality of the good or service provided.81 Nonetheless, competition 
on data protection might also be an independent factor for the acquisition of personal 
data. 
The extent of competition on data protection is an empirical question: it depends on 
whether consumers value such protection when they decide whether to consent 
(directly or through associated contracts) to personal data processing. This is part of 
market definition. Consumers naturally also value the associated good or service, and 
the definition of both markets coexists insofar as they satisfy particular demands: a 
market for the good or service, based on consumer preferences, and a market for the 
acquisition of personal data, based on its value for undertakings. These two markets 
are nevertheless connected, as the demand for the good or service may relieve 
undertakings from competitive constraints on the data protection conditions offered. 
Many undertakings in a digital economy thus compete for valuable personal data, 
each one through their own particular service and the power they hold in relation to it. 
This is the reverse of personal data constituting a barrier in the markets for other 
goods and services: here, it is market power in those ancillary markets that would 
condition the acquisition of personal data. 
Imperfect choice 
Is it possible for competition for goods and services to completely subsume 
competition for the acquisition of personal data based on data protection? This would 
occur if consumers did not care at all about data protection. That was ostensibly the 
case in Asnef-Equifax since the Court did not consider whether borrowers would be 
sensitive to banks sharing information about their solvency. Furthermore, the                                                              
79  Commissioner Vestager, “Refining EU Merger control system”, 10 March 2016, < 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/refining-eu-merger-control-
system_en>. The Commission and NCAs are thus considering revising their notification thresholds to 
capture such mergers even if the entities involved generate low turnovers at the time.  
80 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 6. 
81 See the references supra note 46. 
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provision of free services accompanied by incomprehensive or largely ignored data 
processing conditions might lead to the impression that data protection is not a 
genuine concern for consumers.82 
While the answer to this query would depend on an empirical assessment, this 
impression that data protection is not a genuine concern for consumers might be 
misleading. Behavioural evidence regarding the ‘free effect’ 83  and the power of 
defaults84 suggests that consumers’ interest in data protection is distorted by other 
factors. These phenomena may contribute to the existing ‘privacy paradox’: while 
many users express concerns about privacy, few actually act on them.85 However, 
even those few are enough to raise competitive concerns. Not all consumers care 
about the same things, and data protection might particularly affect the marginal 
consumers which keep market power in check. 86  Those consumers might also 
constitute a separate market governed by competition on data protection.87 
Moreover, undertakings may already be exercising their market power to foment 
consumers’ supposed lack of interest for data protection: competition on this 
parameter may be supressed and therefore the current data protection conditions 
offered do not reflect the competitive level. An analogy could be made to situations 
where an undertaking has already exercised its power to impose high prices, and thus 
the current price does not reflect a competitive price.88 As explored below, high prices 
can be likened to detrimental data protection conditions such as excessive data 
retention, inadequate data security, or diminished control over personal data. In other 
words, impenetrable processing conditions offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis might 
result from market power, particularly in relation to associated goods and services. 
Therefore, while competition on data protection may appear idealistic, it may be 
market power that is preventing such competition from emerging.89 
3.2. Data protection as a normative yardstick 
The need for normative guidance 
It has been argued by some authors that ‘competition on privacy’ is an aspect of 
competition for certain goods and services so that anti-competitive behaviour that 
harms privacy can be equated to a degradation of quality in these goods and 
services.90 The value of this work is that it places harm to privacy within competitive 
parameters, thereby avoiding the objection that competition law is used to achieve                                                              
82 Manne and Sperry, op. cit. supra note 59, 5. 
83 Gal and Rubinfeld, op. cit. supra note 15, 9 and Newman, op. cit. supra note 69, 31. 
84 Stucke and Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 64, 35. 
85 Cofone, op. cit. supra note 51. 
86 See O.J. 1997, C 372. Commission Notice on Market Definition, point 17. On adapting market 
definition to tests based on quality, see Gebicka, op. cit. supra note 69, 158, and Stucke and Ezrachi, 
“The Curious Case of Competition and Quality”, (2015) 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 4. 
87 All that it is necessary is for those consumers to be able to be effectively discriminated – and, by 
definition, personal relates to data subjects that are identified or identifiable. O.J. 1997, C 372. 
Commission Notice on Market Definition, point 43. Privacy-enhancing technologies, as referred in 
Facebook/WhatsApp, would constitute an easy way to set such consumers apart. See 
Facebook/WhatsApp, cit. supra note 40, point 87 and footnote 79. 
88 When defining markets for the purpose of investigating abuses of dominance, the Commission states 
that ‘the fact that the prevailing price might already have been substantially increased will be taken into 
account’. Commission Notice on Market Definition, cit. supra note 87, point 19. 
89 Potential competition is sufficient to trigger competition rules, as demonstrated in IMS in relation to 
a product which was only used internally. Case C-418/01, IMS, EU:C:2004:257, para. 44.  
90 See supra notes 45 and 46. 
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non-competitive aims. These authors nevertheless treat ‘competition on privacy’ as 
normatively neutral: the quality of privacy would be no different than the quality of 
any other goods or service. To some extent, controlling market power will be 
beneficial for competition irrespective of the character of the product. However, by 
failing to ‘reach out’ to data protection law for normative guidance on how to assess 
anti-competitive behaviour, ‘competition on privacy’ is also open to criticism.  
Critics have suggested that ‘competition on privacy’ does little to help disentangle 
alleged ‘anticompetitive quality effects from simultaneous (neutral or pro-
competitive) price effects’,91 particularly if consumer preferences are split between 
privacy and a good and service provided against the disclosure of personal data.92 In 
other words, the degradation of quality can be balanced by improvements in other 
competitive parameters, thereby casting doubt on whether a competition authority 
should investigate such a practice. Moreover, the exact point when this degradation in 
quality should trigger intervention is hard to determine: what if, for instance, despite 
the degradation in privacy the undertaking still offered a superior quality product 
overall?93 Sceptics thus fear that there are no ‘limiting principles’ once privacy harm 
is pursued.94 This criticism of ‘competition on privacy’ results from the absence of a 
concrete benchmark on which to base a decision to intervene (or not),95 and may well 
lead to paralysis.  
A normative framework is needed to help guide this analysis. Consumer decisions 
reflect whether competition exists, but they cannot determine whether particular 
conduct is anti-competitive. For example, if consumers are charged high prices as a 
result of collusion, abuse or a merger, they would still pay what they believe a good 
or service is worth to them.96 It is the normative framework of competition law that 
allows these situations to be sanctioned, and thus treated differently to naturally high 
market prices. If the agreement to permit personal data processing had a price it 
would fit more easily within this framework: many goods and services compete on 
non-price parameters, but this is reflected in the price (for instance, a decrease in 
quality for a given lower price). 97  Personal data, however, is often processed in 
exchange for goods or services that are free or do not reflect the value of the data.98 
As such, competition law is bereft of normative tools to assess how data protection 
conditions reflect non-price parameters. 
Data protection law can provide competition law with the normative tools it lacks. 
Legitimate and lawful data processing must have a legal basis and respect specified 
safeguards. Where personal data processing relies on consent as a legal basis, data                                                              
91 Manne and Sperry, op. cit. supra note 59, 3. 
92 Ibid., 6. 
93 Stucke and Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 64, 40. 
94 Ohlhausen and Okuliar, op. cit. supra note 12, 40. 
95 The idea of ‘competition on privacy’ is an attempt to solve this conundrum by implicitly resorting to 
the normative content of the right to privacy. However, authors do not make anti-competitive 
behaviour dependent on a breach of privacy law nor, as mentioned above, is data protection 
synonymous with privacy. 
96 That is demonstrated in the demand curve modelled by economists for any market. 
97 Stucke and Ezrachi, op. cit. supra note 86, 2. 
98 We are referring in the latter case to the disclosure of personal data often required for online 
transactions without improving them or lowering their price commensurate with the data’s value. 
Commissioner Vestager has stated that consuming free services against the provision of data ‘doesn't 
have to be a problem, as long as people are happy that the data they share is a fair price to pay for the 
services they get in return’. “Making data work for us”, 9 September 2016, < 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/making-data-work-us_en>. 
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processing conditions are akin to any other market offer. Terms offered to individuals 
– such as the level of data security provided, the extent and purposes for which 
personal data will be processed, and the information and control provided over 
personal data – are all likely to be improved by competition, or to deteriorate in the 
presence of market power. Furthermore, infringements of the rights granted by data 
protection law provide a clear negative normative marker: these are situations which 
are considered normatively censurable regardless of consumer preferences.  
Data protection law can therefore serve as a normative yardstick for assessing 
competition on data processing in all its dimensions – not only quality99 but also 
choice and innovation.100 This claim is predicated on competition law being open to 
normative influence from other fields of law. Yet, such normative influence is 
possible as competition law is a member of the EU law family: its values are partly its 
own, partly those of its siblings. In pursuing their shared objectives, both fields of law 
should be applied in a coherent and mutually reinforcing manner. As illustrated 
below, national law and intellectual property law also exert such a normative 
influence on competition law. There is no reason to deny data protection such a role. 
While critics may suggest that this instrumentalises competition law to achieve data 
protection law, the ‘internal’ role proposed for data protection in this section is 
compatible with the aims of competition law and, indeed, merely helps competition 
law to achieve these aims in circumstances where price is not the only relevant 
competitive parameter.  
Article 101 TFEU 
Agreements between undertakings to set prices or divide markets, and thereby stop 
competing, are prohibited as restrictions by object under Article 101 TFEU. 101 If 
undertakings collude by aligning their data protection conditions so as to effectively 
end competition between them in relation to this protection, 102  Article 101 TFEU 
would prohibit such conduct. Such alignment would, like exchanges of information 
and other restrictive forms of coordination, remove ‘the degree of uncertainty as to 
the operation of the market’.103 Article 101 TFEU could therefore apply to industry 
efforts to self-regulate competition on data protection, such as agreements on personal 
data collection and sharing. Competition law could capture the alignment of data 
protection conditions in this way without any apparent input from data protection law: 
the reduction of uncertainty such alignment of data protection conditions would entail 
would be sanctioned in the same way as the alignment of any other competitive 
parameters.                                                               
99 The EDPS comments that ‘[p]rivacy and standards of data protection and data security are parts of 
this quality parameter’. Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 13. 
100 This even applies to price in relation to discrimination, an area where personal data might play an 
important role. Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 6, and Miller, “What do we worry about when 
we worry about price discrimination? The law and ethics of using personal information for pricing”, 
(2014) Journal of Technology and Policy 41, 70. Competition law has the normative tools to deal with 
discrimination based on personal data if it is outright prohibited (as with discrimination based on 
nationality) or if the focus is on its effects on market power. However, if harm to consumers must be 
assessed (such as with potentially exploitative individual price discrimination) this will be equally 
difficult without the normative indications of data protection law. See Manne and Sperry, op. cit. supra 
note 59, 6. 
101 CB, cit. supra note 44, para. 51. 
102 Concluding that private incentives for developing privacy standards also involve the risk of anti-
competitive collusion, see O’Brien and Smith, op. cit. supra 17, 38. 
103 Case C-8/08, T-Mobile, EU:C:2009:343, para. 35. 
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However, data protection law can also serve as a defining benchmark for restrictions 
by object pursuant to Article 101 TFEU. Restrictions by object are defined as ‘by 
their very nature … harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition’.104 
Competition law assessments of what constitutes ‘normal competition’ may require a 
complex assessment of how certain markets should operate and can be influenced by 
other fields of law that regulate or influence such competition.105 For instance, in 
Allianz Hungária 106  when assessing whether an agreement between insurance 
companies and dealers was restrictive by object, the Court used national law as its 
benchmark to determine the degree of independence required of dealers vis a vis 
insurance companies according to the ‘the proper functioning of the car insurance 
market’.107 Without this guidance from national law, it would be impossible to know 
whether dealers were supposed to act in the interests of insurance companies or 
consumers.  
This reliance by the Court on national law illustrates that when Article 101 TFEU 
does not have the normative tools required to assess competitive parameters, it can 
reach out to other areas of law for normative guidance. In essence, Allianz Hungária 
shows that certain levels of quality, choice, or innovation to which consumers are 
entitled can be determined by norms outside of competition law.108 This is consistent 
with the general logic of Article 101 TFEU: anti-competitive agreements are null and 
void and give rise to civil liability109 to allow background conditions that have been 
distorted by force of agreement to reassert themselves.110 
Data protection law can be deployed in an analogous manner as it is this law that 
specifies the desired level of data protection for consumers. Agreements between 
undertakings that infringe data protection law would come under particular 
scrutiny,111 since it is clear that they fall below that level.112 Nevertheless, as set out 
above, it would always be necessary that the infringement hinders competition on data 
protection – as it is in relation to the alignment of data protection conditions. This 
defuses potential objections that Article 101 TFEU would be used to enforce 
compliance with data protection rules (ruled out by the Court in Asnef-Equifax). 
Although it is not their main purpose, data protection rules also provide the normative                                                              
104 CB, cit. supra note 44, para. 51. 
105 This was the case with the exchange of information in Asnef-Equifax, which was not considered 
restrictive by object for reasons related to the working of the credit market and where the Court 
mentioned the existence of similar schemes in other Member States. Asnef-Equifax, cit. supra note 37, 
paras. 46-48. 
106 Case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária, EU:C:2013:160. 
107 Ibid., para. 47. 
108 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, footnote 83. The German and French NCAs also note the 
influence of national law in Allianz Hungaria, closely followed by the German case law that links 
abuse of dominance with ‘the laws regulating general conditions and terms of trade’. Joint Report of 
the German and French NCAs, cit. supra note 9, 23. 
109 Voidness is expressly set out in Article 101(2) TFEU, while liability for competition damages was 
first explored in relation to Article 101(1) TFEU. Case C-453/99, Courage, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, 
para. 26. 
110 Thus, in Genentech the Court rejected that a licence agreement could restrict competition if it could 
be freely terminated. Case C-567/15, Genentech, ECLI:EU:C:2016:526, Para. 40 
111 Agreements that lead to a lower level of data protection without constituting an infringement of data 
protection law could also fall under Article 101 TFEU as restrictions by effect, similarly to the second 
kind of exploitation discussed in relation to Article 102 TFEU. 
112 Like horizontal price-fixing cartels, it can be said that such infringements are so likely to have 
negative effects on the parameters of data protection competition that it is redundant to prove those 
effects. CB, cit. supra note 44, para. 51. 
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framework for the processing of personal data for competitive purposes.  Data 
protection infringement can thus fall outside ‘normal competition’. 
Article 102 TFEU 
Data protection law may play its biggest role as a normative yardstick under Article 
102 TFEU, which prohibits, amongst others, ‘unfair purchasing or selling prices or 
other unfair trading conditions’. Article 102 TFEU therefore prohibits ‘exploitative’ 
abuses, whereby dominant undertakings charge consumers excessive prices or 
otherwise exploit them. The Court has equated excessive prices to deviations from the 
‘economic value’ of a good or service.113 The difficulty of determining the fair ratio 
between price and economic value has nevertheless raised a host of problems which 
have prevented exploitative abuses from being sanctioned and left many authors 
arguing that the prohibition of exploitative abuses should not be applied at all.114 
Describing the current understanding of exploitative abuses, Gal concludes that ‘it is 
unclear what the appropriate benchmark is in most circumstances’.115 Data protection 
law can provide such a normative benchmark for identifying exploitation in relation 
to non-price parameters. This has been expressly acknowledged by the German and 
French NCAs, who observe in their joint report: 
‘looking at excessive trading conditions, especially terms and conditions which are 
imposed on consumers in order to use a service or product, data privacy regulations 
might be a useful benchmark to assess an exploitative conduct’.116The EDPS has, in a 
similar vein, emphasised that fairness is a criterion of both exploitative abuses and 
personal data processing, and has suggested that its proposed Digital Clearing House 
should develop guidelines on harm to consumers resulting from abusive 
exploitation.117  
There are two ways in which data protection provides a normative yardstick against 
which to judge exploitation in the context of personal data processing. In these 
circumstances, as under Article 101 TFEU, the exploitation would need to relate to 
competition on data protection. First, the failure to honour rights granted by data 
protection law, or the infringement of dedicated data protection safeguards, provide 
clear indications of exploitative conditions.118 Second, a legal decrease in control over 
personal data or an increase in the extent of processing – for example, a wholesale 
change to the initial data processing conditions offered to individuals that users must 
accept in order to continue using an online service 119  – might be considered 
exploitative in the same way that a sudden and unjustified increase in price has been 
considered abusive.120                                                              
113 Case 27/76, United Brands, EU:C:1978:22, p. 250 and Gal, “Abuse of Dominance – Exploitative 
Abuses” in Lianos and Geradin (Eds), Handbook on European Competition Law, 13. Excessive prices 
could apply to disclosing personal data not commensurate with the service provided, as discussed in 
note 89 supra.  
114 See, for all, Gal, op. cit. supra note 113, 29. 
115 Ibid., 30. 
116 Joint Report of the German and French NCAs, cit. supra note 9, 25. 
117 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 15. 
118 Gebicka and Heinemann argue that Facebook might abusively exploit consumers in relation to the 
conditions governing the ‘protection of the information shared online’ and its ‘onerous deletion’. 
Gebicka and Heinemann, op. cit. supra note 68, 164-167. 
119 Ibid., 163-164.  The EDPS also notes the unfairness of these conditions. Opinion of the EDPS, cit. 
supra note 8, 13. 
120 Case 247/86, Alsate, EU:C:1988:469.  
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The German NCA initiated an investigation of Facebook alleging that Facebook has 
abused a position of dominance by exploiting consumers.121 The press release issued 
by the German NCA, which is the only publicly available official document to date, 
states that the NCA is investigating suspicions that Facebook’s conditions of use are 
in violation of data protection law, and that Facebook’s use of ‘unlawful terms and 
conditions could represent an abusive imposition of unfair conditions on users’.122 It 
further states that the German NCA is investigating the connection between this 
infringement and Facebook’s potential dominance.123 Therefore, it is unclear whether 
the German NCA will attempt to connect exploitation with exclusion – that is to say, 
with the reinforcement of market power – or whether it will pursue the latter 
separately, as an exclusionary abuse of dominance.  
As stated from the outset, market power and a worsening of data protection conditions 
can be mutually reinforcing. The Court has nevertheless established that the 
conditions of dominance and abuse must be interpreted separately, so that no causal 
relationship between them is required. 124  A dominant undertaking has a ‘special 
responsibility’ not to further distort competition,125 regardless of whether exploitative 
conditions contribute to the dominant position or whether they are only made possible 
by it.126 In short, an exploitative abuse based on a data protection infringement does 
not have to be linked with the acquisition or reinforcement of market power. 
An exclusionary abuse might however be based on a data protection infringement: 
dominant undertakings are also under a special responsibility to only resort to 
‘competition on the merits’ 127  and a data protection infringement represents a 
departure from such competition on the merits. Not all exclusionary abuses (even 
those involving the use of personal data) will need to resort to data protection law as a 
normative benchmark. For instance, an undertaking’s refusal to grant competitors 
access to personal data might be considered abusive if it completely excludes 
competition from the market. An assessment of whether such conduct was 
exclusionary could be undertaken on the basis of existing case law relating to 
exclusionary abuses in the market for other goods and services without any normative 
input from data protection law.128   
Exclusionary abuses may nevertheless also be assessed by reference to other fields of 
law, thereby paving the way for data protection law to be used as a normative 
benchmark. In AstraZeneca129 the Court held that it was contrary to competition on                                                              
121 Bundeskartellamt, “Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of having 
abused its market power by infringing data protection rules”, 2 March 2016, 
<http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Fac
ebook.html>. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 In Hoffman-LaRoche the Court declared that ‘the interpretation suggested by the applicant that an 
abuse implies that the use of the economic power bestowed by a dominant position is the means 
whereby the abuse has been brought about cannot be accepted’. Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para. 91 
125 Post Danmark I, cit. supra note 43, para. 23, and Gal, op. cit.supra note 113. 
126 This does not mean that a causal relationship does not exist, only that the competition authority is 
dispensed from proving it in order to establish an abuse of dominance. A competition authority might 
nevertheless chose to prove so in order to reinforce the economic rationale of pursuing the abuse or the 
consequences for consumer welfare. 
127 Post Danmark, cit. supra note 43, para. 25. 
128 IMS, cit. supra note 89, paras. 38 and 40. 
129 Case C-457/10, AstraZeneca, EU:C:2012:770.  
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the merits to obtain an exclusive right – a patent – by deceiving public authorities.130 
A similar finding could be made if the acquisition of market power was tainted by a 
data protection infringement, 131  as may be the case in the German NCA’s 
investigation of Facebook.132 This would not impose extra obligations on dominant 
undertakings to abide by data protection law, in the same way that AstraZeneca did 
not impose additional obligations on dominant undertakings in relation to intellectual 
property law, but simply clarifies ‘competition on the merits’ in light of the 
appropriate regulatory background. 
Indeed, intellectual property law may provide a pertinent analogy to support the 
influence of data protection law on both exploitative and exclusionary abuses. 
Competition law treats the conferral of intellectual property rights as rewards for 
innovation. As such, competition authorities are generally reluctant to treat prices 
charged pursuant to those rights as exploitative or to pursue refusals to licence as 
exclusionary, even if consumers have no alternative, as this might chill incentives to 
innovate. Nevertheless, innovation is a competitive parameter and some abuses of 
dominance have concerned intellectual property. In such instances, intellectual 
property law has acted as a normative benchmark for competition law by allowing 
competition authorities to determine whether rewards for innovation are adequate by 
reference to intellectual property law.133 Hence, the Court has deemed it exploitative 
to charge licence fees when the services protected by a trademark were not used.134 
Furthermore, as AstraZeneca illustrates, rewards are inappropriate – and thus abusive 
– when intellectual property rights are unlawfully acquired. Intellectual property law 
therefore provides normative guidance to competition law on the appropriate scope 
and regularity of intellectual property rights.135 The conditions set by data protection 
law for the processing of personal data could be similarly imported into such Article 
102 TFEU assessments. 
Merger Control 
Finally, data protection law can be used as normative yardstick for assessing non-
price competition in the context of merger control. Under the EUMR, a concentration 
might be prohibited (or conditions imposed upon it) if, among others, it leads to the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position. The Commission exercises these 
powers in relation to mergers that are likely to increase market power and thus 
negatively affect competitive parameters.136 It analyses these prospective mergers by                                                              
130 Ibid., para. 98.  
131  Whether this would require effects on the market structure or, similarly to AstraZeneca, be 
considered abusive per se is an open question. 
132 The German NCA states, after referring to allegedly unfair conditions by Facebook, that ‘[i]f there 
is a connection between such an infringement and market dominance, this could also constitute an 
abusive practice under competition law’. Bundeskartellamt, cit. supra note 121. 
133  By establishing that refusals to licence will only be considered abusive in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ the Court has determined that they generally are. IMS, cit. supra 89, para. 35. It remains 
to be seen whether refusals to licence which prevent the exercise of the right to portability may 
integrate these exceptional circumstances. 
134 Roughly speaking, trademarks guarantee the reputation of the holder, which is not at stake when its 
services are not used. Case C-385/07 P, Grüne Punkt, EU:C:2009:456. Similarly, royalty schemes 
which do not adhere to a patent’s duration have also been considered restrictive under Article 101 
TFEU in certain circumstances. See the analysis of that case law in Opinion of A.G. Whatelet in 
Genentech, cit. supra note 110, points 85-97. 
135 Prices charged for spare parts under design rights have also been considered open to exploitative 
abuses. Case 238/87, Volvo Veng, EU:C:1988:477. 
136 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers, cit. supra 42, point 10.  
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investigating whether the concentration leads to the removal of competitive 
constraints or to a higher level of transparency and coordination in the market.137 
Although the interests of consumers are only one of the factors that the Commission 
should take into account, 138  market power is defined as the possibility to act 
independently of consumers and thus to worsen competitive parameters.139  
As in the context of exploitative abuses, a price increase by a merged entity is 
equivalent to a deterioration of non-price conditions, and again, competition law lacks 
normative tools to assess this deterioration in relation to data protection conditions. 
Data protection law can provide such normative references. Indeed, the guidelines 
that the EDPS proposes that the Digital Clearing House should enact to determine 
harm to consumers would apply both to exploitative abuses and merger control.140 It 
is however more difficult to conclude ex ante that a merged entity will worsen data 
protection conditions than ex post when the consequences of the abuse have already 
been felt. Nevertheless, in Tetra Laval141 the Court found that the Commission should 
investigate whether a merger leads to ‘conditions in which abusive conduct is possible 
and economically rational’.142 Therefore, a competition authority should examine the 
parties’ potential data protection conditions post-merger, both as an indication of 
market power and as a possible source of abuse.  
The Commission did not take the opportunity in Facebook/WhatsApp to examine 
competition on data protection conditions, as discussed above. Arguably, pursuant to 
Tetra Laval, the Commission should have investigated the possibility that 
WhatsApp’s data protection conditions would be degraded post-merger. These data 
protection conditions have indeed been subsequently changed.143 However, because 
the Commission declared that ‘privacy-related concerns’ fell outside the scope of its 
review,144 it could not subject the approval of merger to conditions in this regard.145 
In any event, the Commission’s reasoning in Facebook/WhatsApp that the parties’ 
activities did not overlap on a relevant market is unsatisfactory. The data protection 
concerns that the merger raised, dismissed as non-economic, hinted at the true 
competitive problem: both Facebook and WhatsApp actively acquired personal data, 
and not only did Facebook acquire a competitively relevant asset (which the 
Commission now recognises to be the driver of the acquisition)146 but it may have 
also effectively neutralised WhatsApp’s innovation on better data protection 
conditions. 147  Thus, the EDPS has used this merger as an example of when 
cooperation between data protection and competition authorities may be desirable in 
order to anticipate such developments.148 
                                                             
137 Ibid., points 17-19. 
138 EUMR, cit. supra note 32, Art. 2(1). 
139 See supra note 42. 
140 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 15. 
141 Case C-12/03, Tetra Laval, EU:C:2005:87. 
142 Ibid., para. 74. 
143 Opinon of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 10. 
144 Facebook/WhatsApp, cit. supra note 40, point 164. 
145 O.J. 2003, L 1/1, Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Art. 9(1). 
146 See supra note 79. 
147 Newman comments that ‘[a] monopolist in a zero-price market may impose a naked restraint on 
innovation by rivals’, referring to Microsoft’s targeting of Netscape. Newman, op. cit. supra note 69, 
39. 
148 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 10. 
22 
 
 
4. Obeying the House Rules: the Role of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 
 
Section 3 illustrates how data protection law can exert a normative influence on 
competition law when the material scope of application of both intersects, and data 
protection problems are simultaneously competition law problems. In this section, it is 
suggested that even in the absence of such substantive overlap, data protection can 
exert an influence on competition law procedures and remedies. In such 
circumstances, data protection acts as an external constraint on competition law: it 
does not fit within the logic of competition, or align with its objectives.  
The most evident way that data protection can exert such an external influence on 
competition law is by blocking the application of competition law. In Wouters,149 the 
Court accepted that a ban on an association between lawyers and accountants 
constituted a decision by an association of undertakings that restricted competition. 
However, it held that this ban must be examined in light of its objective, namely to 
ensure that ‘the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound administration of 
justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and 
experience’.150 The Court held that the restriction of competition that the ban entailed 
was inherent in the pursuit of that objective and thus ultimately concluded that there 
was no breach of Article 101(1) TFEU (ex Article 81(1) EC). In this way, an external 
public policy objective prevented the application of competition law.  
Data protection law could also be invoked to justify a potential infringement of 
competition law in certain circumstances. For instance, the EDPS has called for the 
enactment of ‘standards for transparency and intelligibility of contractual terms in 
online services’. 151  Similarly, standards may be required to ensure the good 
functioning of aspects of the GDPR, such as the right to data portability.152 Any self-
regulating standard-setting operation may necessitate an agreement between 
competitors and therefore entail a potential violation of Article 101 TFEU. Data 
protection could then be invoked to justify such a violation. In this capacity, data 
protection would act as an external constraint on the application of competition law. 
Given that this type of external influence is not new, it is unlikely that it would be 
contested.153  
However, this section sets out how the EU Charter may necessitate a more extensive, 
external influence by data protection on other policies, including competition law. 
This claim proceeds in two parts. First, it suggests that the Commission has a positive                                                              
149 Case C-309/99, Wouters, EU:C:2002:98. This analogy may nevertheless be limited, insofar as 
undertakings required to breach competition law in order to comply with data protection legislation 
may rely upon the ‘State compulsion’ doctrine as a defence. Joined Cases C-359 & 379/95, Ladbroke, 
EU:C:1997:531, para. 33. This defence has however been interpreted stringently, and does not apply 
where undertakings have a margin of appreciation. Therefore, an undertaking would not be able to rely 
on it if its actions enhanced the effectiveness of the data protection rules but were not required by the 
letter of data protection law. 
150 Case C-309/99, Wouters, para. 97. The Court subsequently clarified that such restrictions had to be 
proportionate to the objectives pursued. Case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcen v. Commission, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:492, para. 45. 
151 Preliminary Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 26 and 83. 
152 GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 20.  
153 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 10 and footnote 45. 
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obligation to respect and promote the EU Charter. This obligation is explicitly set out 
in the wording of the EU Charter and affirmed by the jurisprudence of the Court as 
well as the actions of the European Commission. Then, secondly, the implications this 
obligation entails for EU competition law are outlined.  
4.1. The Commission’s Obligation to Respect the EU Charter  
The Commission’s obligation to respect and promote the EU Charter stems from the 
wording of Article 51(1) EU Charter, the case law of the Court and the institutional 
structure and stance of the Commission in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. Article 
51(1) of the EU Charter sets out its scope of application. It states:  
The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the 
Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States 
only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the 
rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance 
with their respective powers. 
This provision sets out an obligation for EU institutions and bodies to respect EU 
Charter rights and for Member States to respect these rights when ‘implementing EU 
law’. It is this latter obligation vis-à-vis Member States that has received most 
attention in the doctrine. 154  The Court has had the opportunity to consider the 
meaning of the term ‘implementing EU law’ on a number of occasions155 and this 
jurisprudence has itself generated much commentary.156 However, the obligation that 
Article 51(1) of the EU Charter imposes on EU Institutions has not yet been the 
subject of similar debate and is viewed by many as uncontroversial.157 Ward notes 
that once it is established that an entity falls within one of the categories listed in 
Article 51(1)158 ‘it is incontrovertible that any act produced by it having legal effects 
vis-à-vis third parties must comply with the Charter’.159 As all EU institutions and                                                              
154 Eeckhout, “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Questions”, 39 CML Rev. 
(2002), 945; Knook, “The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the European 
Union”, 42 CML Rev. (2005), 367; Leczykiewicz, “Horizontal Application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, 38 EL Rev. (2013), 479; Egger, “EU Fundamental Rights in the National Legal 
Order: the Obligations of Member States Revisited”, (2006) 25 Yearbook of European Law, 515; 
Rosas, “The Applicability of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights at National Level”, (2013) 
European Yearbook of Human Rights, 97.  
155  Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N. S. and M. E., EU:C:2011:865; Case C-617/10, Fransson, 
EU:C:2013:280; Joined Cases C-483/09 and C-1/10, Gueye and Salmerón Sánchez, EU:C:2011:583; 
Case C-279/09, Deutsche Energiehandels, EU:C:2010:811; Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756; 
Case C-390/12, Pfleger, EU:C:2014:281. 
156 Iglesias Sánchez, “The Court and the Charter: the Impact of the Entry into Force of the Lisbon 
Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to Fundamental Rights”, 49 CML Rev. (2012), 1565; Lenaerts, “The 
Court of Justice of the European Union and the Protection of Fundamental Rights”, (2011) 31 Polish 
Yearbook of European Union Law, 79; Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, “Reflections on the 
Architecture of the EU After the Treaty of Lisbon: the European Judicial Approach to Fundamental 
Rights”, (2011) 17 European Law Journal, 595.  
157 For instance, writing in an extra-curial capacity von Danwitz (and Paraschas) state that ‘[w]hile the 
European Union and its institutions are clearly bound by the Charter, the extent of the Charter’s 
applicability with respect to the Member States is much less evident’. von Danwitz and Paraschas,  “A 
fresh start for the Charter: Fundamental Questions on the application of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, (2012) 35  Fordham International Law Journal 1396, 1399. 
158 The entity must be an EU Institution as defined in Article 13(1) TEU, or a body, office or agency of 
the Union. 
159 Peers and Others, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart, 2014), 1426. The 
main point of contention on this matter will, according to Ward, be whether hybrid agencies such as the 
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organs are bound by the EU Charter, their failure to respect the EU Charter rights 
when enacting legally binding acts (including decisions) can be challenged via Article 
263 TFEU, or before the national courts pursuant to the preliminary reference 
mechanism,160 and will result in a declaration that the act is unlawful.161   
This obligation incumbent on EU institutions to respect the EU Charter is manifest in 
the Court’s jurisprudence. Provisions of secondary legislation adopted by the EU 
institutions must respect EU Charter rights. For instance, in Volker und Schecke162 the 
Court declared for the first time that provisions of secondary legislation that required 
the publication of the names of certain Common Agricultural Policy beneficiaries 
were invalid as they interfered with the EU Charter rights to data protection and 
privacy. In its later Digital Rights Ireland163 judgment the Court declared the entire 
Data Retention Directive invalid as a result of its failure to comply with the same 
rights. Thus it is clear that the failure of the EU legislature to respect the EU Charter 
rights will result in the invalidity of their legislative measures. Equally, a failure of 
the European Commission to respect EU Charter rights when adopting a legally 
binding decision would lead to the invalidity of this decision.   
This existence of a cross-cutting obligation on Institutions to respect and promote EU 
Charter rights also follows from the structure, mandate and actions of the 
Commission, particularly following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Commission decision-making is collegiate and pursuant to its Rules of Procedure,164 
‘Commission decisions shall be adopted if a majority of the number of Members 
specified in the Treaty vote in favour’. As a result, even decisions and legislative acts 
with a strong link to one limb of the Commission (a particular ‘Directorate General’ 
(DG) and Commissioner) must be approved collectively by the College of 
Commissioners. Indeed, the lawfulness of Commission decisions is dependent on this 
collective decision-making. The Court has previously held that the Commission 
cannot delegate the power to adopt competition decisions to the Commissioner 
responsible for competition policy and that acts of the Commission that are not 
adopted in a collegiate manner are unlawful. 165 Furthermore, the Commission has 
now appointed a ‘First Vice-President’ responsible for ‘Better Regulation, 
Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights’. 
This appointment signals that ‘it is a top priority for the new College to safeguard the 
values of the Union, and particularly the rule of law and fundamental rights’. 166 
Indeed, all members of the Commission pledged to uphold the Charter in a solemn 
declaration before the Court of Justice.167 These mechanisms – collegiate decision-
                                                                                                                                                                              
European Institution of Innovation and Technology would be bound by the EU Charter as a Union 
‘agency’.  
160 Article 267 TFEU.  
161 See, for instance, SEC (2011) 567 final, Operational Guidance on taking account of Fundamental 
Rights in Commission Impact Assessments’, 4. This document states: ‘Respect for fundamental rights 
is a legal requirement, subject to scrutiny of the European Court of Justice. Respect for fundamental 
rights is a condition of the lawfulness of EU acts’.  
162 Schecke and Eifert, cit. supra note 17. 
163 Joined Cases C-293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238. 
164  O.J. 2000, L 308/26.  
165  Case C-137/92 P, BASF, EU:C:1994:247, para. 71.  
166 Editorial, “Safeguarding EU values in the Member States – Is something finally happening?”, 52 
CML Rev (2015) 619, 623.  
167 Each Commissioner stated: ‘I solemnly undertake […] to respect the Treaties and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the fulfilment of all my duties’. IP/14/2511, “Juncker 
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making, Vice-Presidential oversight and a Commissioner pledge to respect the EU 
Charter – point to the conclusion that a holistic approach should be taken to 
Commission decision-making, and that various fields of EU policy-making should not 
be treated as hermeneutically sealed silos.  
The Commission has sought to put this crosscutting obligation to respect fundamental 
rights into practice by adopting a ‘Strategy for the effective implementation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union’.168 A key component of this 
strategy is to ensure that the EU is ‘exemplary’ in using the EU Charter ‘as a compass 
for the Union’s policies’. 169  While the Commission seeks to achieve this aim 
primarily by conducting fundamental rights impact assessments of legislative 
proposals,170 it has also explicitly stated that:  
Non-legislative measures adopted by the Commission, such as decisions, are 
also subject to checks on their compatibility with the Charter during drafting, 
even if there is no impact assessment.171  
In light of this legal context, the Commission’s stance in GoogleDoubleclick and 
Facebook/Whatsapp that any data protection infringements its decisions may entail 
should be subject to a subsequent, distinct data protection assessment (as outlined 
above) is no longer tenable. The practical consequences of this finding shall now be 
outlined.  
4.2. Implications for competition law  
Limiting the Commission’s remedial discretion 
The Commission’s horizontal obligation to respect and promote the EU Charter has 
several implications for competition law. Most evidently, the Commission must 
comply with this substantive obligation to respect EU Charter rights when adopting 
legally binding competition law decisions. For instance, the Commission could not 
give binding force to commitments offered by an undertaking to remedy an alleged 
breach of competition law172 if these commitments entailed an interference with the 
right to data protection. An example taken from a NCA will illustrate this point.  
The French NCA initiated legal action against GDF Suez, a gas supplier with a 
dominant position in the market for gas sales at regulated tariffs. GDF Suez was 
accused of abusing its dominant position by, inter alia, using customer data that it 
acquired while it was a public service operator to its competitive advantage. The 
French NCA adopted an interim measure ordering GDF Suez to disclose customer 
data – including personal data, such as customer contact details and consumption 
profiles – to competing energy suppliers in order to enable them to compete 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Commission takes oath of independence at the European Court of Justice”, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-2511_en.htm>.  
168 COM (2010) 573 final. 
169  It pointed to three ways in which this could be achieved: by strengthening the culture of 
fundamental rights at the Commission; taking the Charter into account in the legislative process; and, 
ensuring that Member States respect the Charter when implementing EU law. COM (2010) 573 final, 
4-10.  
170 It provides practical guidance on how this impact assessment can be achieved in a Commission 
Staff Working Document. SEC (2011) 567 final, 3. 
171 COM (2010) 573 final, 6.  
172 Regulation 1/2003, cit. supra note 146, Art. 9(1). 
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effectively.173 This remedy, designed to protect competition, raised data protection 
concerns and thus the NCA worked in conjunction with the French data protection 
authority (CNIL) in order to ensure that the data sharing agreement respected data 
protection law. GDF Suez was ordered to send postal or electronic communication to 
all affected data subjects in order to obtain their consent to the data sharing and to 
provide data subjects with the opportunity to object within 30 days. In this way, a 
potential infringement of the data protection rules in order to secure an end to anti-
competitive conduct was avoided, and the normative objectives of the right to data 
protection (including individual control over personal data) respected.  
A second potential implication for competition law that this horizontal obligation to 
respect the EU Charter may necessitate is that the wide margin of discretion enjoyed 
by the Commission when accepting commitments,174 and the limited review of this 
discretion due to the complex economic assessments it may entail,175 may no longer 
be sustainable when the EU Charter is engaged. It follows from the Court’s case law 
in Schrems176 and Digital Rights Ireland177 that a strict standard of review of acts of 
EU institutions, including Commission decisions, will be applied when EU Charter 
rights are engaged.178 The Treaty competition law provisions are not exempt from this 
obligation and therefore Commission competition decisions that engage EU Charter 
rights may also be subject to this strict standard of review.  
While the Commission’s obligation not to infringe the EU Charter right to data 
protection is clear, the extent of its obligation to respect and promote the EU Charter 
is ambiguous. The institutional and substantive changes brought about by the Lisbon 
Treaty – outlined above – point to an obligation on the Commission’s part, beyond its 
obligation not to breach the EU Charter, to take affirmative actions to ensure that all 
areas of EU policy-making are compliant with the EU Charter. The judgment of the 
General Court in Front Polisario 179  ostensibly confirms this perspective. In that 
judgment a decision of the Council of the EU (‘Council’) to enact a trade agreement 
between the EU and Morocco, including the disputed territory of Western Sahara, was 
annulled as a result of the Council’s failure to incorporate a fundamental rights 
assessment into its decision. The General Court, ruling at first instance, held that 
when exercising its large margin of appreciation, the Council should have examined 
all relevant elements to ensure that there were no indications that the trade agreement 
would ultimately be detrimental to the fundamental rights of the Western Saharan 
territory inhabitants.180  
Front Polisario is under appeal at the time of writing. While the Advocate General 
opined that the General Court judgment should be set aside for lack of standing, he 
nonetheless stated that he could see no convincing reason why the EU institutions ‘are                                                              
173 Décision n° 14-MC-02 du 9 septembre 2014 relative à une demande de mesures conservatoires 
présentée par la société Direct Energie dans les secteurs du gaz et de l’électricité, 
<http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/pdf/avis/14mc02.pdf>. 
174 Case C-441/07 P, Commission v Alrosa Company Ltd., EU:C:2010:377, paras. 60-61. 
175 Ibid., para 67. 
176 Schrems, cit. supra note 19. 
177 Digital Rights Ireland, cit. supra note 164. 
178 In Schrems the Court held that when the Commission adopts a decision regarding the adequacy of 
the third country data protection measures, the Commission’s discretion is reduced and the Court’s 
review of the requirements of secondary legislation, read in light of the Charter, must be strict. 
Schrems, cit. supra note 19, para. 78. 
179 Case T-512/12, Front Polisario, EU:T:2015:953.  
180 Ibid., para. 246. 
27 
 
not required, before the conclusion of an international agreement, to examine the 
human rights situation in the other party to the agreement and the impact which the 
conclusion of the agreement could have there’. 181  Indeed, the Advocate General 
observed that the Council and the Commission had ‘set the bar very high for 
themselves’ by deciding to insert human rights in Impact Assessments.182 
Irrespective of the substantive outcome of the Front Polisario appeal, what is 
important for our purposes is that the General Court judgment follows the same logic 
as Schrems and Digital Rights Ireland: there is an obligation on EU Institutions to 
ensure that legally binding acts – whether decisions or legislation – respect 
fundamental rights; the discretion of EU Institutions is limited in this regard and, a 
failure to comply with this obligation will lead to the annulment of the relevant act. 
Front Polisario goes a step further than Schrems and Digital Rights Ireland by 
indicating that, even if fundamental rights are not evidently engaged, there is an 
obligation on EU institutions to consider the impact of their actions on fundamental 
rights. If upheld by the Court of Justice, such a finding would have even more 
significant implications for the potential impact of data protection, and other EU 
Charter rights, on competition law.  
Ex ante or ex post consideration 
This ‘mainstreaming’ of fundamental rights indicates that the Commission is required 
to consider how its decisions – including competition law decisions – impact upon 
fundamental rights. This could be done ex ante or ex post, or both.  
In its Facebook/Whatsapp merger decision, the Commission held that the merging 
entities were not direct competitors on any relevant markets and therefore the 
transaction would not lead to a significant impediment of effective competition and 
could be cleared without remedies. The shortcomings of this decision, in particular its 
failure to examine whether a market for the acquisition of personal data exists and 
whether competition on data protection on this market would suffer post-merger, were 
outlined in Section 3. However, in addition to internalising data protection’s 
normative concerns in this way, the Commission could also consider whether data 
protection law could have an external influence on competition law. Again, precedent 
for such external influence exists in the context of merger control.  
While the Commission has sole jurisdiction to assess mergers within the EUMR, 
Article 21(4) EUMR provides for a limited exception to this. It allows Member States 
‘to take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken into 
consideration by this Regulation’, provided they are compatible with the general 
principles and provisions of EU law. Media plurality is included amongst these 
legitimate interests. Thus although the Commission is obliged to respect the pluralism 
of the media pursuant to the EU Charter, 183 it fulfils this obligation by allowing 
Member States to examine the potential impact of a merger on plurality.184 According 
to Jones and Davies, this does not confer new rights on Member States: rather, it 
‘articulates their inherent power to impose, subject to EU law, obstacles to investment 
or make it subject to additional conditions and requirements, on the basis of public                                                              
181 Case C-104/16, Front Polisario, EU:C:2016:677, para 262.  
182 Ibid., para 263.  
183 EU Charter, Art. 11(2).  
184 The reason why it is the Member States and not the Commission that conducts this assessment is 
most likely one of subsidiarity, given that the EU has no explicit competence to regulate freedom of 
expression. 
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interest grounds’.185 Mergers in media markets are therefore assessed in parallel by 
competition agencies and sector-specific regulatory bodies, with these two agencies 
assessing the merger according to different substantive standards.186 Underpinning 
this intervention is the idea that democracy will be undermined if media power is 
concentrated in the hands of a limited number of media barons with the potential 
power to jeopardise the free flow of ideas. The Commission could equally fulfil its 
obligation to respect the right to data protection in competition law decisions by 
applying an analogous procedure and allowing a competent body (for instance, the 
EDPS) to assess the implications of a concentration on data protection. It is important 
to note that in these circumstances media plurality, or data protection, acts as an 
external constraint on competition law: the assessment which is removed from the 
hands of DG Competition is a non-competition assessment.187 Moreover, should the 
EDPS (or national data protection authorities) undertake such a non-competition 
assessment of a competition law transaction to guarantee its compatibility with the 
data protection rules, this assessment would be in compliance with their institutional 
‘independence’. 188  This independence merely prohibits data protection authorities 
from seeking or taking instructions from third-parties; it does not, and should not, 
prevent data protection authorities from cooperating with one another, or with other 
regulators and agencies.189  
Alternatively (or in addition) the Commission could require an ex post assessment of 
the impact of concentrations on fundamental rights.190 Such ex post checks are carried 
out in the context of EU legislative instruments,191 and there is no legal obstacle to 
their use to evaluate the effects of a competition decision on fundamental rights. In 
this way, empirical evidence could be gathered to inform Commission decision-
making in areas such as mergers in data-driven markets. Indeed, precedent for such 
ex-post assessment of mergers by the Commission already exists. Many mergers are 
passed subject to economic conditions that are verified ex post and, pursuant to the 
EUMR, the validity of these merger clearance decisions is contingent upon respect for 
these economic conditions. 192  The Commission could therefore also render the 
validity of its merger decisions contingent upon respect for data protection conditions 
stipulated in advance of the merger.  
Possible objections                                                              
185 Jones and Davies, ‘Merger Control and the Public Interest: Balancing EU and National Law in the 
Protectionist Debate’ (2014) 10(3) European Competition Journal 453, 489.  
186 Drexl, ‘Competition law in media markets and its contribution to democracy – a global perspective’, 
(2016) Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research, Paper No 14-16, 14.  
187 Data protection can, under the logic described in Section 3, also act as an internal constraint on the 
Commission’s prosecutorial and remedial discretion. See Costa-Cabral, op. cit. supra note 8, 506-512. 
188  The independence of the EDPS is set out in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of 
such data [2001] OJ L8/1, Art 44. The independence of data protection authorities is established by:  
Directive 95/46, cit. supra note 4, Art. 28(1); GDPR, cit. supra note 18, Art. 52. 
189 For instance, the Dutch and Canadian data protection officials conducted a joint investigation and 
issued a joint report on WhatsApp’s compliance with data protection and privacy laws. See Autoriteit 
Persoonsgegevens, ‘Dutch DPA: WhatsApp non-users better protected’, 3 November 2015. 
<https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/news/dutch-dpa-whatsapp-non-users-better-protected> . 
190 This idea was mooted by former FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones-Harbor in the context of the 
Google/Doubleclick transaction. 
191 COM (2010) 573 final, 6.  
192 EUMR, cit. supra note 32, Art. 8(2). 
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Despite their modesty, these suggestions are likely to meet with objection. First, it 
could be argued that assessing the impact of a competition law decision on rights such 
as data protection ‘hijacks’ competition law to achieve data protection aims. Such an 
objection must however be dismissed as this paper does not propose that a general 
obligation be placed on the Commission to enforce data protection law through its 
competition law competences. Rather, it suggests that the Commission cannot use its 
competition law competences in a manner that breaches the right to data protection or 
jeopardises its effectiveness. Indeed, the application of competition law rules is 
limited by the principle of legality.193 This principle prevents the Commission from 
using its sanctioning and investigative powers to pursue a data protection complaint in 
the absence of a competition law infringement foreseeable by the undertakings 
involved. 194  Therefore, all of the constituent elements of a competition law 
infringement must be present (for instance, an agreement between undertakings that 
restricts competition in the case of Article 101 TFEU) before an ex ante or ex post 
examination of fundamental rights implications could be undertaken, otherwise the 
Commission would be unlawfully usurping its competition law competences.195  
It might equally be argued that ‘once everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive’,196 
and that requiring the Commission to factor fundamental rights considerations in its 
decision-making would set it down a slippery path.197 Indeed, as outlined at the outset 
of this paper, one of the reasons why the Commission has rejected the incorporation 
of public policy and non-economic concerns into its analysis is the fear that their 
inclusion would open the door to political influence and incommensurable analysis.198 
The proposal set out in this section is however more limited, and is grounded in law 
rather than politics. Nevertheless, it would apply to other EU Charter rights. Why, for 
instance, should the enforcement of competition law imperil personal, social or 
environmental rights? We suggest that if Commission intervention is justified in the 
data protection context, it should not be withheld simply because this would also 
force the Commission to protect other rights, when appropriate. The wording of the 
EU Charter, the jurisprudence of the Court and the structure of the Commission 
confirm that fundamental rights bind the Commission. The parameters of this new 
responsibility now need to be defined.  
Finally, the argument might be made that DG Competition is ill equipped to carry out 
the assessments proposed in this paper. This claim must be rejected. Members of DG 
Competition have succeeded in integrating economic principles into competition law 
assessments despite initial concerns. If such non-legal principles can be mastered for 
the purposes of legal assessment, it seems pessimistic to argue that the basic 
principles of data protection law cannot be mastered by lawyers for the same purpose.                                                              
193 The principle of legality ‘implies that legislation must define clearly offences and the penalties they 
attract’. This principle is satisfied when the individual or undertaking is ‘in a position, on the basis of 
the wording of the relevant provision and with the help of the interpretative assistance given by the 
courts, to know which acts or omissions will make him criminally liable’. Case C-303/05, Advocaten 
voor de Wereld VZW v Leden van de Ministerraad, EU:C:2007:261, para. 50.  
194 Case C-194/14 P, AC-Treuhand, EU:C:2015:717, paras. 41-44.  
195 Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom, EU:T:2008:101, para. 270. 
196 Easterbrook, “Limits of Antitrust”, (1984) 63 Texas Law Review 1, 12.  
197 See, by analogy, Odudu, “The Wider Concerns of Competition Law”, (2010) 30(3) OJLS 599. 
198 For instance, in a White Paper dating from 1999, it stated that the purpose of Article 101(3) TFEU is 
to ‘provide a legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow the 
application of competition rules to be set aside because of political considerations’. O.J. 1999, C 132/1. 
White paper on modernization of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86, 57.  
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Indeed, DG Competition must already respect the data protection principles in its 
procedures, just as it must respect other fundamental rights. Where more complex 
assessments are required, DG Competition could be assisted in conducting such 
assessments by, for instance, the DJ JUSTICE Impact Assessment Steering Group199 
or by the EDPS. Indeed, the EDPS is specifically tasked with ensuring the EU 
Institutions respect data protection law and has already proposed such a holistic 
solution to problem solving in the digital environment,200 as have NCAs.201 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The intersection between data protection and competition law mapped in this article 
indicates that, simply put, data protection concerns should matter for the application 
of competition law. The impact of data protection law on competition law should go 
beyond the descriptive role it plays as part of the legal background for competitive 
assessments, or the procedural role it plays when the Commission is obliged to 
respect the rights of data subjects in its investigations. Rather, data protection law 
should have a material influence on competition law. This article has concentrated on 
how data protection can be used to assess non-price competitive parameters and how 
data protection law can also condition the exercise of the Commission’s competences 
to enforce competition law. 
While it is clear that these regimes pursue autonomous substantive concerns using 
different methods, it is also apparent that they overlap in limited situations. As 
members of the EU law family with a shared interest in the protection of the 
individual, it is reasonable to query how a more holistic approach to their application 
can be achieved. This is all the more so given that there are structural impediments to 
effective data protection which cannot be rectified through data protection legislation 
alone. Nevertheless, there is vocal resistance to such a holistic approach, with 
formalistic objections to any suggested alterations to ostensibly neutral economic 
analysis and established enforcement practices. However, personal data is not a 
commodity to be regulated by raw economic principles. Neither is data protection law 
a neutral legal background: it contains normative indications that condition 
expectations and duties whenever personal data is processed, which – irrespective of 
whether these constraints are acknowledged by ‘competition on privacy’ – extends to 
personal data’s role in the competitive process. 
There are two advantages of bringing these indications to the foreground. The first is 
that competition law inevitably has to apply to competition on data protection, and in 
tandem with data protection law it can construct a picture of which aspects are better 
left to the market and which should be set out in regulation. The second advantage is 
that the EU is currently in uncharted territory. While the EU legal order has long been                                                              
199 SEC (2011) 567 final, 11.  
200 Opinion of the EDPS, cit. supra note 8, 15; the EDPS had already mentioned the idea of an ‘EU 
clearing house for supervisory authorities to consider whether individual cases may raise questions of 
compliance with competition, consumer and data protection rules’ in its earlier Opinion, Preliminary 
Opinion, cit. supra note 8, 10.  
201 European Conference of Data Protection Authorities, ‘Resolution of The Spring Conference of data 
protection authorities’, May 2016, <http://www.naih.hu/budapest-springconf/files/Resolution---new-
frameworks.pdf>. This Resolution calls for a new framework for cooperation that recognises the  
‘synergies between regulatory frameworks for consumer, antitrust and data protection, notably in the 
digital society and economy’.  
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underpinned by respect for fundamental rights, the EU Charter provides a visible legal 
hook with which to challenge the compatibility of the acts of EU Institutions with 
fundamental rights and thus intensifies their application. The specialisation that is a 
characteristic of the Commission’s administrative action is thus being challenged. The 
commonalities between data protection and competition law, as well as the 
indications given by the Court in Schrems and Polisario Front, provide the ideal 
testing ground for the Commission’s obligation to guarantee the effectiveness of 
fundamental rights. This is not only a cause of apprehension for entrenched views in 
competition law. There are also fears, from the data protection law side, about 
legitimising markets for personal data through the application of competition law, 
when it is arguable that such markets were neither envisaged nor desired by the data 
protection framework. However, as with any family, the links between data protection 
and competition law should not be seen as a weakness, both are stronger together – 
even if, like fully developed fields of law, they see each other only on special 
occasions. 
